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AN ANALYSIS OF THE OUTER CONTINENTAL
SHELF LANDS ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1978
ROBERT B. KRUEGER* and LOUIS H. SINGER**

The Outer Continental Shelf has been called "America's best hope
for finding additional oil and gas resources and reducing our dependence on foreign oil."' Indeed, beneath the 1.3 million square miles

of continental shelf and slope over which the United States has jurisdiction and control, 2 there exists an enormous quantity of energy

resources. Demonstrated reserves of offshore oil and gas are approximately 3.5 billion barrels of oil and 36 trillion cubic feet of gas, with
prospective reserves of an additional 8 to 50 billion barrels of oil and
28 to 199 trillion cubic feet of gas.' Although only 17 percent of
domestic oil and gas production currently comes from the continental shelf, some studies estimate that offshore oil and gas may comprise as much as one-fourth to one-third of total U.S. production by
1985.' In addition, there are various hard minerals which are recoverable from the continental shelf by available mining techniques. 5
The first federal act to authorize the leasing of the resources of the
Outer Continental Shelf was the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
of 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the "1953 act"). 6 With the excep*Partner, law firm of Nossaman, Krueger & Marsh, Los Angeles, California.
**Associate, law firm of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, New York, New York.
1. 124 CONG. REC. S13,994 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Jackson). For
purposes of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the term "Outer Continental Shelf"
includes "all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath
navigable waters [title to which is confirmed unto the coastal states] and of which the
subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and
control." 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976). The term "continental shelf" as used in its geologic
sense extends only to lands lying interior of the geologic slope. For a discussion of the scope
of federal jurisdiction over offshore lands, see infra note 6.
2. R. KRUEGER, MANAGEMENT OF ENERGY RESOURCES ON FEDERAL LAND 1
(CALLAGHAN ENERGY LAW SERVICE, MONO. 11A, 1978) [hereinafter cited as
KRUEGER, MANAGEMENT OF ENERGY RESOURCES]. This figure does not include
the offshore lands owned by the states.
3. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, cited in H.R. REP. NO. 590,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1977).
4. Id. at 74.
5. M. BARAM & D. RICE, MARINE MINING OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 1
(1978). These minerals include sand and gravel, phosphorite, manganese oxide, calcium
carbonate, barite, and various types of placer minerals.
6. 43 U.S.C. § § 1331-1343 (1976). The basis for this exercise of sovereign powers over
the resources of submarine areas beyond the territorial sea was President Truman's landmark
proclamation, issued in 1945, in which he announced that "the Government of the United
States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf
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tion of one limited amendment, 7 this "epochal statute" 8 remained
unchanged for twenty-five years until the passage of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 (hereinafter referred
to as the "1978 act").9 The 1978 act was itself the culmination of
five years of congressional activity.0 While the bulk of the 1978 act
consists of amendments to the 1953 act, it also establishes an Offshore Oil Spill Pollution Fund' 1 and a Fishermen's Contingency
Fund1 2 and amends the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.1 3
The 1978 act has many policy objectives, the most significant of
which are the following:
1. To make oil and other natural resources available to meet
domestic energy needs as rapidly as possible;
2. To balance development with protection of the environment;
3. To insure the public a fair return in exchange for development
of the resources of the Outer Continental Shelf;
4. To preserve and maintain free enterprise competition with
respect to such development; and
5. To provide coastal states with an opportunity to participate in
beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to
the United States [and] subject to its jurisdiction and control." Presidential Proclamation
No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 Comp.). At the same time President Truman issued
Executive Order 9633 which ordered that "the natural resources ... of the continental shelf
... contiguous to the coasts of the United States ... [be] placed under the jurisdiction and
control of the Secretary of the Interior for administrative purposes, pending the enactment
of legislation in regard thereto." 3 C.F.R. 437 (1943-1948 Comp.)
Prior to 1947, it was thought that California and the other coastal states owned the land
underlying the territorial sea. In 1947, however, the United States Supreme Court determined in United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1948), that the federal government had
"paramount rights in and.., full dominion over the resources of the soil under that water
area, including oil." Id. at 3 8-39, The same principle was confirmed as to other coastal states
in succeeding decisions, which brought about the political pressure that resulted in the
Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § § 1301-1343 (1976). That act in effect reversed
United States v. California by vesting in the coastal states the ownership of lands "beneath
navigable waters within [their respective] boundaries," 43 U.S.C. § 131l(a) (1976), which
were defined as lands lying within three geographical miles of the "coast line," 43 U.S.C.
§ 1301(b) (1976). It also permitted historic boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico to the extent
of three marine leagues (9 miles). Id. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 was
adopted as a companion measure to the Submerged Lands Act.
7. The Deepwater Port Act, 33 U.S.C. § § 1501-1524, 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976), § 19(f)
declared that the state laws applicable to OCS activities are those currently in force in the
respective states, rather than those which were in force as of the effective date of the 1953
act. 43 U.S.C. §1333 (1976).
8. Christopher, The Outer ContinentalShelf Lands Act: Key to a New Frontier,6 STAN.
L. REV. 23, 23 (1953).
9. 16 U.S.C.A. § §1456-1456a, 1464; 30 U.S.C.A. §237; 43 U.S.C.A. § §1331-1334,
1337, 1340, 1343-1356, 1801-1802, 1811-1824, 1841-1847, 1862-1866 (Supp. 1979).
10. For a summary of that activity, see H.R. REP. NO. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95-100
(1977).
11. 43 U.S.C.A. § §1811-1824 (Supp. 1979).
12. 43 U.S.C.A. § § 1841-1847 (Supp. 1979).
13. 16 U.S.C.A. § §1456-1456a, 1464 (Supp. 1979).
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decisions relating to the resources of the Outer
policy and planning
14
Continental Shelf.
In Part I of this article, the administrative system of the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, as amended, will be analyzed by examining each of its functional aspects in light of its objectives. The
discussion will concentrate on the changes made by the 1978 act and
the problems these amendments were designed to alleviate. The other
elements of the 1978 act will be discussed in- Part II. In the concluding part, the discussion will focus on the general nature of U.S.
offshore resources policy as reflected in the 1978 act.
I. PROVISIONS AND POLICIES OF THE OUTER CONTINENTAL
SHELF LANDS ACT, AS AMENDED
A. Selection of Lands for Lease
The 1953 act vested in the Secretary of the Interior the authority
to grant mineral leases covering areas of the Outer Continental Shelf
not already under lease or withdrawn from leasing under the act's
provisions.1 5 The 1953 act did not, however, set forth standards or
guidelines by which the Secretary was to select areas for lease sale.
Further, the act failed to establish a system whereby the Secretary
could obtain the technical data needed to assess the potentiality of
offshore mineral prospects.
The absence of guidelines for selecting tracts in the 1953 act gave
rise to congressional charges that the Department of the Interior had
too much discretion' 6 and that affected coastal states and local
governments did not participate sufficiently in the decision-making
process. 1 7 The problems caused by the government's lack of information were somewhat relieved by amendments to the regulations of
the Department of the Interior which required companies conducting
offshore exploratory work to disclose their geological and geophysical data to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS),' 8 which couldin
turn assist the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in making tract
the
selections.' I Congress, however, perceived that BLM needed
20
means of aquiring better information about offshore resources.
The 1978 act attempts to limit the Secretary of the Interior's
discretion in selecting lands for lease by requiring him to submit a
14. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1802 (Supp. 1979).
15. 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976).
16. See H.R. REP. NO. 590, supra note 3, at 103.
17. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. S13,994 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1978) (remarks of Sen.
Jackson).
18. 30 C.F.R. § §251.12, 252.3 (1978).
19. 43 C.F.R. §3301.2 (1978).
20. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 590, supra note 3, at 199.
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comprehensive oil and gas leasing program to the Congress and by
setting forth the considerations upon which such a program is to be
based. 2 1 Thus, the 1978 act provides that in determining the timing
and location of exploration, development, and production, the Secretary must take into account not only available information about the
various oil and gas bearing offshore regions, but also such considerations as whether developmental benefits and environmental risks are
being equitably shared among such regions, the "laws, goals, and
policies of affected States," the needs of regional energy markets,
and the interests of potential oil and gas producers.2 2 The Secretary
is also directed to obtain a proper balance between the potential for
environmental damage, the potential for discovery of oil and gas, and
the potential for an adverse impact upon the coastal zone. 2 3
To provide a greater role for state and local governments in the
planning process, the 1978 act requires the Secretary to solicit comments from the governors of states affected by a proposed leasing
program, 2 4 who may in turn request comments from local governments. 2 I Affected states and local governments also have the right
under the 1978 act to submit recommendations regarding the size,
timing, or location of specific lease sales or development and production plans. 2 6 A state's recommendation in this regard must be accepted, and that of a local government may be accepted, if the
Secretary determines that it provides for "a reasonable balance between the national interest and the well-being of the citizens of the
affected State." ' 2" The Secretary's determination of the merits of a
recommendation controls unless found to be arbitrary or capri2
cious. 8

21. 43 U.S.C.A. §1344 (Supp. 1979).
22. 43 U.S.C.A. §1344(a)(2) (Supp. 1979).
23. 43 U.S.C.A. §13 4 4(a)(3) (Supp. 1979).
24. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1344(c)(2) (Supp. 1979). The term "affected state" as defined in the
act includes any state which is designated by the Secretary as a state in which there will be
significant changes in the social, governmental or economic infrastructure resulting from
OCS activities or in which there will be a significant risk of serious damage to the marine
and coastal environment in the event of any oil spill or blowout. 43 U.S.C.A. §1331(f)
(Supp. 1979).
25. 43 U.S.C.A. §1344(c)(2) (Supp. 1979). Thus, on March 9, 1979, the Secretary of
the Interior sent his proposed leasing schedule to the affected coastal states. The proposal
included the holding of 26 lease sales between 1980 and 1985. 10 COASTAL ZONE
MANAGEMENT NEWSLETTER (March 14, 1979).
26. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1345(a) (Supp. 1979).
27. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1345(c) (Supp. 1979).
28. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1345(d) (Supp. 1979). Additional state input is provided through the
interplay between the 1978 act and the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ § 1451-1464 (1976). In general, an OCS development plan will not be approved unless it is
consistent with any approved coastal zone management program of an affected state. See 16
U.S.C. § 1456 (1976).
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Implementation of the goal of coastal state involvement in the management of federal energy resources may hinder the rapid develop-'
ment of offshore resources, another goal of the 1978 act. Like the
Deepwater Port Act, 2 9 the 1978 act extends the influence of the
coastal states far beyond the coastal lands owned by them pursuant
to the Submerged Lands Act. 3 0 The oil and gas industry has already
expressed the fear that implementation of the 1978 act will reduce
the total amount of petroleum that is produced.3 1
Predictably, the tiers of study, planning, and 'mandatory determinations required by the 1978 act, which are in addition to those
imposed by the National Environmental Policy Act,3 2 will delay
offshore development. Such delay can only be justified if it is the
sole means of protecting the coastal and marine environment, a proposition which can and should be empirically tested. Clearly, the burden of proving the value of greater coastal state participation lies
with those supporting that goal.
The 1978 act's objective of increasing the federal government's
knowledge of offshore resources is furthered by the enactment of the
oil and gas information program, 3 3 which is in large part a codification of regulations recently adopted by USGS.3 I This program requires that the Secretary be given access to all data and information
obtained by lessees and permittees in the course of exploration,
development, or production under the condition that its confidentiality will be maintained unless the lessee or permittee agrees to its
disclosure.3 I Based upon a finding that the government's existing
collection of data "relies too heavily on unverified information from
industry sources," 3 "6 the 1978 act also directs the Secretary to conduct a continuing investigation of the availability of oil and natural
gas resources on the Outer Continental Shelf and to report to Congress on his findings.3 I The version of the 1978 act which passed the
Senate in July 1977 would have authorized the federal government
to conduct both geological and geophysical operations for this purpose. This authorization was deleted from the final version of the
act, however, thereby leaving the manner in which information is to
be gathered to the Secretary's discretion.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

33 U.S.C. § § 1501-1524 (1976).
43 U.S.C. § § 1301-1315 (1976).
[19781 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1454.
42 U.S.C. § §4321-4347 (1976).
43 U.S.C.A. § 1352 (Supp. 1979).
30C.F.R. § §252.1-252.6 (1978).
43 U.S.C.A. § 1352 (Supp. 1979).
43 U.S.C.A. §1865(a)(3) (Supp. 1979).
43 U.S.C.A. § 1865 (Supp. 1979).
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The 1953 act required that an oil and gas lease not contain more
than 5,760 acres (9 square miles).' 8 The clear preference on the part
of the major oil companies has been for large offerings of blocks of
the maximum size, and this has been the usual practice of the Department of the Interior under the 1953 act. Through 1975, the
typical sale has resulted in the leasing of 71 tracts, with each tract
covering an average of 4,645 acres 3 9 The 1978 act retains these
same acreage restrictions unless the Secretary finds that "a larger area
is necessary to comprise a reasonable economic production unit."'4
B. Allocation of Lands; Lease Sales
1. Alternative Bidding Systems.
The 1953 act required that oil and gas leases be issued by competitive bidding 4 1 and authorized the Secretary of the Interior to call for
bidding on the basis of cash bonus with a fixed royalty of not less
than 121/2 percent or on the basis of a royalty bid with a 1212 percent
minimum and a fixed cash bonus. 4 2 Except in certain instances in
which a higher flat royalty was stated or there was experimental
royalty bidding, the practice of the Secretary under the 1953 act was
to issue leases with a 16-2/3 percent royalty and on the basis of the
highest cash bonus bid.4 3
The 1978 act continues the requirement that leases be allocated
on a competitive basis and authorizes the two methods of bidding
specifically called for by the 1953 act.4 a In addition, it authorizes
the adoption of any of the following bidding systems: (1) a variable
royalty bid with a fixed work commitment based on a dollar amount
for exploration, (2) a cash bonus bid, or work commitment bid with
a fixed cash bonus, and a diminishing or sliding royalty, (3) a cash
bonus bid with a fixed share of the net profits at a rate of not less
than 30 percent, (4) a net profits bid with a fixed cash bonus, (5) a
cash bonus bid with a fixed royalty and a net profits interest, and (6)
38. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b) (1976).
39. UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR
AFFAIRS, 94th CONG. 2d SESS., JOINT BIDDING FOR FEDERAL ONSHORE OIL
AND GAS LANDS, AND COAL AND OIL SHALE LANDS 19 (Comm. Print 1976).
40. 43 U.S.C.A. §1337(b) (Supp. 1979).
41. 43 U.S.C. §1337(a) (1976). Despite its considerable advantages, the concept of
competitive bidding has not been accepted in most countries. A study of world petroleum
policies which the authors of this article prepared revealed that the petroleum systems of
most countries show no evidence that rights to explore for or exploit petroleum are allocated on a competitive basis.
42. Id.
43. H.R. REP. NO. 590, supra note 3, at 138; KRUEGER, MANAGEMENT OF ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 2, at 43.
44. 43 U.S.C.A. §1337(a)(1) (Supp. 1979).
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a work commitment bid with a fixed cash bonus and a fixed royalty.4 ' Moreover, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to adopt
any other system of bid variables, terms and conditions which is
determined to be useful to accomplish the act's purposes, unless the
Senate or House passes a resolution disapproving such system. 4 6 The
1978 act also requires that bidding systems other than bonus bidding
be applied to not less than 20 percent and not more than 60 percent
of the total area offered for leasing during each of the five years
following the act's passage, unless the Secretary of the Interior determines such a requirement is "inconsistent with the purposes and
policies" of the act.4
This emphasis on alternative bidding systems is based upon a
desire to encourage experimentation under the largely unsupported
belief that the use of these alternative systems will facilitate the
entry of independent oil companies into U.S. offshore petroleum
development. 4 8 In fact, even when not taking into account bonus
bidding or other preleasing expenses, the costs of operating on the
OCS are typically so high as to exclude the small company.4 Also,
the considerable advantages of the cash bonus bidding system should
not be overlooked. This system is simple to administer, provides an
incentive for early development, and affords the government an early
return of revenue. Lastly, it is the most popular form of allocation in
industry, a fact which seems to have weighed against it in the Congress.
On the other hand, there are disadvantages to using many of the
alternatives to cash bonus bidding. Net profits bidding avoids the
premature abandonment problem created by a high, flat royalty but
has one basic defect: the larger the reserved net profits interest, the
less incentive the operator has to be efficient. There may in fact be
an incentive to be inefficient where the operator has a very small
share of net profits but receives an administrative allowance of a
specified percentage of operating expenses.
Under a work commitment or development contract bidding system, resource rights are allocated to the firm which commits itself to
45. Id.
46. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1337(a)(1)(H) (Supp. 1979); 43 U.S.C.A. § 1337(a)(4) (Supp. 1979).
47. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1337(a)(5)(B) (Supp. 1979).
48. H.R. REP. NO. 590, supra note 3, at 139.
49. According to Lloyd Unsell, executive vice-president of the Independent Petroleum
Association of America, less than 1% of roughly 10,000 independent operators have the
economic resources "to go offshore." According to Mr. Unsell, the average independent
does not expect or want to compete on the OCS. Mr. Unsell suggests that the high operating
costs of offshore operations and not federal legislation are the major reason for this attitude.
Sumpter, Why U.S. independents aren't rushing offshore, 77 OIL AND GAS J. 67, 68
(March 5, 1979).
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spending the greatest sum in developing the resource. While this alternative would ensure the rapid development of offshore resources, the
effect of the system is to divert monies that might otherwise be paid
as a bonus or for a higher royalty to exploratory operations. Thus,
the work commitment bidding system can be viewed as a government
subsidy of the exploratory programs offered by the lessee.5 0 For this
reason, the criteria for evaluating this subsidy should be comparable
to those applied to a direct appropriation of public funds. Further, it
should be noted that the adoption of this bidding system suggests a
judgment that the resources would not otherwise be optimally developed. A basic drawback in many of the development contracts that
have been seen to date has been that they have encouraged companies to offer to perform work unnecessary for the efficient development of the resource. Further, such contracts are difficult to
administer and require many subjective judgment factors.' 1
Royalty bidding, whether on a flat royalty basis (lease awarded to
the highest gross royalty offered) or a sliding scale basis (lease
awarded to the highest multiple of a stated royalty scale), is frequently suggested as a means of attracting bidders who do not have
the funds to compete on the basis of cash bonus or of interesting
bidders in exploring unattractive properties which are presently
undeveloped. There are, however, some basic drawbacks to both
forms of royalty bidding. Royalty in any form creates an inherent
problem of resource economics. It becomes part of the fixed costs of
operation and thereby contributes to diminishing the operator's incentive to produce as such costs approach the value of production.
Flat royalty bidding compounds the problem: the greater the royalty, the greater the incentive to abandon a well prematurely.
A sliding scale royalty presents less of a problem in this respect
because the royalty adjusts downward with a decrease in production,
but this factor also provides the operator with incentive to produce
at the lowest permissible rate in order to reduce the royalty. The
extraction of the resource may, therefore, be unreasonably delayed,
with a correlative delay in the payment of royalty to the government. It is also true of any type of royalty bidding that the ultimate
return to the lessor will depend upon the success of the lessee's
operation.
The premature abandonment problem could be substantially eliminated by providing for a successively decreasing royalty, possibly
50. ERICKSON, WORK COMMITMENT BIDDING, in MINERAL LEASING AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY 61 (M. Crommelin & A. Thompson eds. 1977).
51. Krueger, An Evaluation of the Provisionsand Policies of the Outer ContinentalShelf
Lands Act, 10 NAT. RES. J. 763, 790 (1970).
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even providing for its termination, when production or reserves reach
stated minimal levels. Such a system would, however, encourage the
operator to establish the stated lower levels prematurely in order to
reduce royalty in the same fashion as does the sliding scale. It would
also create a much greater administrative burden on the leasing
agency.
2. Joint Bidding.
The use of joint bidding in Outer Continental Shelf lease sales has
been gradually increasing in recent years; whereas prior to 1972 it
was unusual for more than one-half of the bids submitted in any
lease sale to be jointly formed, the presence of a majority of joint
bids has been commonplace since that time.' 2 Joint bidding allows
companies to spread their investment over a larger number of leases,
thereby significantly reducing their risk of not making a commercial
discovery of oil or gas. This would suggest that joint bidding results
in increased participation in lease sales and higher lease sales,' ' both
of which are goals of the 1978 act.
The use of joint bidding by the majors, however, has come under
attack on the ground that it has lessened competition and deterred
the entry of the independents into OCS development. While there is
considerable question about whether this conclusion is valid,5 ' joint
bidding on OCS leases among companies that produce more than 1.6
million barrels per day of crude oil, natural gas, and liquified petroleum was banned by the Department of Interior on September 19,
1975,1 5 and by Congress three months later.' 6 The 1978 act continues this prohibition but allows for an exemption if both of the
following conditions are present: the leases offered for sale cover
lands which have "extremely high cost exploration or development
problems" and exploration would not occur on those lands unless
the exemption were granted.5 I The Secretary of the Interior recently denied a request to allow joint bidding by the majors on
Beaufort Sea tracts on the basis that exploration and development
would still occur even if joint bidding for these tracts were not
allowed. 8
In addition to mandating the use of alternative bidding systems
and restricting joint bidding, the 1978 act contains other provisions
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

KRUEGER, MANAGEMENT OF ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 2, at 45.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 39, at 19-35.
See KRUEGER, MANAGEMENT OF ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 2, at 45.
43 C.F.R. § 3302.3-2(a) (1978).
42 U.S.C. §6213(c) (1976).
42 U.S.C.A. §6213(c) (Supp. 1979).
See 10 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT NEWSLETTER 4 (March 7, 1979).
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designed to encourage competition. Thus, the 1978 act provides that
following each notice of a proposed lease sale but before the acceptance of bids, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Federal
Trade Commission, has 30 days to review the competitive effects of
the sale. 5" The Secretary of the Interior is free to reject a recommendation of the Attorney General that the lease sale may create a
situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws, as long as he notifies
the Attorney General and the lessee of the reason for his decision. 6 0
The 1978 act also requires the Secretary of the Interior to give due
consideration throughout the leasing process to the views of the
Attorney General with respect to matters which may affect competition. 6 '
C. Persons Who May Hold Leases; Term
Like the 1953 act, the 1978 act authorizes the grant of leases to
"qualified" persons but contains no restrictions as to citizenship. 6 2
Both the current 63 and the proposed6 4 regulations of BLM, however, restrict the holding of leases to citizens, resident aliens, or
corporations of the United States or its states or territories. Even
though foreign nationals and corporations are not permitted to hold
leases, they are free to use domestic subsidiaries and have done so
extensively. 6 Further, any person authorized by the Secretary may
conduct geological and geophysical operations on the Outer Continental Shelf,6 6 and the regulations do not contain any restrictions in
this regard. Thus, the class of entrants to OCS development is determined not by regulation but by economic interest in the resource
offered.
The purpose of efficient resource management appears to be
served by the existing system, which permits open competition but
guarantees the federal government legal jurisdiction over its Outer
59. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1337(c) (Supp. 1979).
60. Id.
61. 43 U.S.C.A. §1334(a) (Supp. 1979).
62. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1337(a) (Supp. 1979).
63. 43 C.F.R. § 3300.1 (1978).
64. 44 Fed. Reg. 6,474 (1979) (proposed § 3316.1).
65. 1 NOSSAMAN, WATERS, SCOTT, KRUEGER & RIORDAN, STUDY OF THE
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS OF THE UNITED STATES, Tables 8-3, 8-6, 8-20
(1968) [hereinafter cited as NOSSAMAN OCS STUDY]. See R. KRUEGER, THE UNITED
STATES AND INTERNATIONAL OIL: A REPORT FOR THE FEDERAL ENERGY
ADMINISTRATION ON U.S. FIRMS AND GOVERNMENT POLICY at A-26 (1975). For
example, British Petroleum through a subsidiary owns a major part of the North Slope
Alaska reserves.
66. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1340(a)(i) (Supp. 1979).

October 1979]

ANAL YSIS OF SHELF LANDS A CT

Continental Shelf lessees. This purpose is also served by the absence
of any restrictions on the number of acres that any operator can hold
under lease. In this regard, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act is
clearly superior to the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920 with its
individual acreage restrictions.6 7
The 1978 act continues the requirement of the 1953 act that oil
and gas leases endure for an initial period of five years "and as long
after such initial period as oil or gas is produced from the area in
paying quantities, or drilling or well reworking operations as approved by the Secretary are conducted thereon." 6 8 Unlike the 1953
act, however, the 1978 act allows the Secretary of the Interior to
issue leases for an initial period of up to ten years where the longer
period is necessary "to encourage exploration and development in
areas because of unusually deep water or other unusually adverse
conditions.", 69 This amendment should satisfy those who have suggested that a five-year primary term for oil and gas leases may be too
short with respect to drilling on the continental slope and in areas
such as Alaska where operations must be conducted on a short
season basis. 7 0
D. Operations
Many aspects of lease administration relating to operations on the
Outer Continental Shelf are affected by the 1978 act. Like the 1953
act and regulations thereunder, the 1978 act is concerned with maximizing production, with safety, and with environmental protection.
The 1978 act amends the 1953 act to limit administrative discretion
and to provide for additional planning and studies, new sanctions,
and closer governmental supervision in these areas.
With respect to exploratory operations, the 1978 act establishes
procedures for the submission of exploration plans by lessees and for
the evaluation and approval of such plans by the Secretary of the
Interior.7 1 While the new statutory provisions relating to exploration
plans are similar to regulations currently in force, 7 2 significant
changes have been made. Unlike existing regulations, the 1978 act
establishes specific criteria according to which the Secretary must
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

30 U.S.C. § 184 (1976).
43 U.S.C.A. §1337(b)(2) (Supp. 1979).
43 U.S.C.A. § 1337(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 1979).
1 NOSSAMAN OCS STUDY, supra note 65, § 11.45.
43 U.S.C.A. §1340(c) (Supp. 1979).
30C.F.R. §250.34-1 (1978).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 19

approve or reject an exploration plan and requires that the Secretary
act on a proposed plan within 30 days of its submission.'
In most areas of the OCS, lessees must also submit development
and production plans to USGS prior to undertaking such activities. 4
The 1978 act requires lessees to produce any oil or gas obtained
pursuant to an approved plan at rates consistent with any rule or
order issued by the President .7 1 If no such rule or order is issued,
lessees must comply with rates established by the Secretary of Energy which are designed to assure the maximum rate of production
which may be sustained without loss of ultimate recovery of oil or
6
gas?
In addition to making a range of traditional enforcement actions
available to the Secretary, including lease cancellation 7 and criminal
and civil penalties, 7 8 the 1978 act prohibits the submission of a bid
for a lease "if the Secretary finds, after notice and hearing, that ' the
79
bidder is not meeting due diligence requirements on other leases."
This provision reflects a concern raised in numerous forums at
various times since the 1973 oil embargo that the oil companies
might be withholding oil and gas from production to create an artificial scarcity. The Secretary of the Interior in 1977 investigated the
issue by creating a departmental committee to review certain oil and
gas leases that were not then in production. In June 1977, the Interior Department announced the cancellation of two federal oil and
gas leases in the Gulf of Mexico, citing a lack of drilling activity.
Since that time, a study done by the National Research Council of
the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of
73. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1340(c)(1) (Supp. 1979). The latter amendment contained in the 1978
act should hasten exploration. Existing regulations (currently in the process of being modified) require the USGS Supervisor to withhold a decision on an exploration plan until
written comments have been received from each affected state or until 30 days after each
state receives a copy of the plan, whichever comes first. 30 C.F.R. §250.34-1(d)(1)(ii)
(1978). As one environmental scientist has commented, "if the exploration plan were vigorously opposed by the state or local governments, the five year lease period may well expire
before even the exploration plan can be approved, much less the development and production plan." Letter from Dr. David Smith to USGS (November 8, 1977) (commenting on
1977 proposed revision of OCS oil and gas operating regulations).
74. 43 U.S.C.A. §1351(a)(1) (Supp. 1979). The 1978 act provides an exemption for
tracts in the Gulf of Mexico and for tracts for which a lease was issued before September 18,
1978, and with respect to which no oil or gas has been discovered in paying quantities. Plans
may be required, however, for tracts which, although located in the Gulf of Mexico, are
adjacent to the State of Florida. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1351(1) (Supp. 1979).
75. 43 U.S.C.A. §1334(g)(1) (Supp. 1979).
76. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1334(g)(2) (Supp. 1979).
77. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a) (Supp. 1979).
78. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (Supp. 1979).

79. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1337(d) (Supp. 1979).
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Engineering showed that, in at least one of the six fields reviewed,
accelerated production of natural gas was warranted. 8 0
It has recently been suggested that a large number of prospective
bidders will be disqualified from bidding because they are not meeting due diligence requirements elsewhere, and that as a result this
sanction is contrary to the objective of increasing competition for
OCS leases. 8 On the contrary, the fact that this prohibition might
apply to many bidders strongly supports those who believe a sanction of this nature is necessary. Also, it seems that in exercising
control over public resources, the federal government must be given
at least some of the powers of a private landowner to increase revenues and manage effectively. Those powers should include the right
to ignore prospective lessees not meeting their leasehold obligations
elsewhere.
Building on regulations promulgated in the aftermath of the Santa
Barbara oil spill, the 1978 act attempts to reduce dangers to the
environment from OCS operations by providing for the suspension
and cancellation of leases to prevent serious environmental harm88 2
and for the protection of the clean air standards of coastal zones. 3
The 1978 act also directs the Secretary to conduct studies of areas
included in lease sales and areas already developed in order to assess
environmental impacts of oil and gas development on the human,
marine, and coastal environment. 8 4
In the period from 1953 through 1975, 13,087 wells were drilled
in the OCS.8 ' Sixty-eight people died in accidents involving such
wells and about 107 were injured.8 6 To provide for safe OCS operations, the 1978 act requires the use of the best available and safest
technologies that are economically feasible 8 and provides for increased civil and criminal penalties for violations. 8 8 In addition, the
80. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1835, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 24-25 (1979).
81. See 77 OIL AND GAS J. 73 (March 19,1979).
82. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a) (Supp. 1979).
83. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1351(d) (Supp. 1979).
84. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (Supp. 1979).
85. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, OIL AND GAS IN COASTAL
LANDS AND WATERS 26 (1977).
86. Id.
87. 43 U.S.C.A. §1347(b) (Supp. 1979). An exception is made for cases where the
Secretary determines that the incremental benefits "are clearly insufficient to justify the
incremental costs of using such technologies." Id. Concerning best available and safest
technologies, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, BEST AVAILABLE & SAFEST TECHNOLOGIES-GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION (July 19, 1979) (report prepared by the Panel on Best Available & Safest
Technologies, Assembly of Engineering).
88. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (Supp. 1979).
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1978 act requires the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of
the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating, in consultation with other appropriate federal agencies, to commence promptly
a joint study of existing safety and health regulations and of the
technology, equipment, and techniques available for the exploration,
development, and production of OCS minerals. 9 On the basis of
that study, the President must submit to Congress his proposals for
the promotion of safety and health in OCS activities.9 0
E. Other Uses of the Outer ContinentalShelf
In enacting the 1978 act, Congress determined that the federal
government must assume the responsibility of minimizing conflict
between the exploitation of oil and gas and other uses of the marine
environment, including recreational activity and the recovery of
other resources such as fish and shellfish. 9' Accordingly, the 1978
act provides that in adopting and revising a leasing program, the
Secretary of the Interior must consider other uses of the sea and
seabed, including fisheries, navigation, sealanes, and potential sites of
deepwater ports. 9 2 Further, the 1978 act requires the Secretary of
Commerce, in cooperation with the Secretary of the Interior, to
conduct a survey of obstructions on the OCS and to develop charts
identifying the same for use by commercial fishermen.9 '
The 1978 act fills a gap in the law by extending the scope of the
9 4
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to cover geothermal resources.
The act still fails to provide, however, for the licensing or development of fresh water resources, living resources, salvage and treasure
trove, the construction of islands and artificial structures, and dredging and filling. 95
II. OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
LANDS ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1978

A. Offshore Oil Spill Pollution Fund
The risk of oil pollution can be expected to increase as oil and gas
activity accelerates on the Outer Continental Shelf. As a result, Con89. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1347(a) (Supp. 1979).
90. Id.
91. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (Supp. 1979).
92. 43 U.S.C.A. §1344(a)(2)(D) (Supp. 1979). The Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33
U.S.C. § §1501-1524, 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976), establishes a mechanism for licensing and
regulating the ownership and construction of "deepwater ports," defined as any facility
beyond the territorial sea and used as a port or terminal for the loading, unloading or
storage of oil. 33 U.S.C. § 1502 (10) (1976).
93. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1847 (Supp. 1979).
94. 43 U.S.C.A. §1331(q) (Supp. 1979).
95. See KRUEGER, MANAGEMENT OF ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 2, at
§ 11A.33.
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gress provided in the 1978 act for an oil spill liability fund to pay for
the prompt removal of any oil spilled or discharged as a result of
OCS activities and for any damages to public or private interests
caused by such spills or discharges. 9 6

Specifically, Title III of the 1978 act establishes an Offshore Oil
Pollution Compensation Fund in an amount not to exceed $200
million to be administered by the Secretary of Transportation and
the Secretary of the Treasury. 9 The fund is financed by the imposition of a fee of three cents per barrel on all oil produced on the OCS,
and by money obtained through fines, penalties, and reimbursements. 9 8 The three cents per barrel fee is "imposed on the owner of
the oil when such oil is produced."

99

Prior to adoption of final

regulations under the 1978 act by the Coast Guard, many commentators in industry suggested that the government's royalty share of
production should be excluded from the amount of oil used as a
basis for calculating the fee.' 0I The substance of their argument was
that because the government is entitled to take its royalty share of
production in kind, the federal government and not the producer is
the owner of "royalty oil" at the time such oil is produced. The
Coast Guard, however, rejected this argument in adopting its final
regulations.' 0 1

Title III contemplates recovery for two types of economic losses
arising out of or directly resulting from oil pollution: removal costs
and damages. 1 02 Any person residing in the U.S., the federal government, a state government, or a local governmental entity may assert a
claim for removal costs.' 03 Each of the foregoing persons or entities
may also assert a claim for injury to, or destruction of, real or personal property and for loss of use of real or personal property or
natural resources.' 04 Further, any of the foregoing persons or entities which derived at least 25 percent of their earnings from activities which utilized damaged property or natural resources may assert
a claim for loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity from
injury to or destruction of that property or those natural resources.' 0' The President, acting as a trustee for OCS resources, and
state governments can assert a claim for injury to or destruction of
96. 43 U.S.C.A. § §1811-1824 (Supp. 1979).

97. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1812(a) (Supp. 1979).
98. 43 U.S.C.A. §1812(b) (Supp. 1979).
99. 43 U.S.C.A. §1812(d)(1) (Supp. 1979).
100. See 44 Fed. Reg. 16,860 (1979).
101. Id.
102. 43 U.S.C.A. §1813 (Supp. 1979).
103. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1813(b)(1) (Supp. 1979).
104. 43 U.S.C.A. §1813(b)(2) (Supp. 1979).
105. 43 U.S.C.A. §1813(b)(4) (Supp. 1979).
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natural resources.1 06 The federal government and any state or political subdivision thereof may assert a claim for loss of tax revenues for
a period of one year due to injury to real or personal property.' 07
Finally, the Attorney General can bring an action for removal costs
or damages on behalf of a group of U.S. residents if he determines
that the claimants would be more adequately represented as a
class.' 08
Owners and operators of vessels (other than public vessels) or
offshore facilities are strictly liable for all of the foregoing types of
losses.' 0 I Title III limits the amount of their liability, however,
except when the incident causing the pollution is the result of willful
misconduct, gross negligence, or the violation of safety standards of
the federal government. ' 0° Where these exceptions do not apply,
the liability of the owner or operator of a vessel is limited to
$250,000 or $300 per gross ton, whichever is greater.' '' The owner
or operator of an offshore facility is liable for the total of removal
and cleanup costs plus an amount limited to $35 million for all
damages.' 2 Notwithstanding these limitations, however, an owner
or operator of an offshore facility or vessel from which an oil discharge occurs must bear all costs of removal incurred by the federal
or any state government or any local official or agency.'I 3 The
fund is liable without limitation for all uncompensated losses except
as to particular claimants who have caused such losses through their
own willful misconduct or negligence. '4
The most controversial aspect of Title III is the requirement that
each offshore facility used for drilling for, producing, or processing
oil, or which has the capacity to transport, store, transfer, or otherwise handle more than 1,000 barrels of oil at any one time, must
establish and maintain "evidence of financial responsibility" in the
amount of $35 million.' ' ' Evidence of financial responsibility may
be established by any one or any combination of the following
methods: insurance, guaranty, indemnity, surety bond, qualification
as self-insurer, or any alternative method accepted by the Fund
Administrator. ' 16 Each of these methods of "evidencing financial
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

43
43
43
43
43
43
43
43
43
43
44

U.S.C.A. §1813(b)(3) (Supp. 1979).
U.S.C.A. § 1813(b)(5) (Supp. 1979).
U.S.C.A. §1813(b)(7) (Supp. 1979).
U.S.C.A. § 181 4 (a) (Supp. 1979).
U.S.C.A. §1814(b) (Supp. 1979).
U.S.C.A. §1814(b)(1) (Supp. 1979).
U.S.C.A. §1814(b)(2) (Supp. 1979).
U.S.C.A. § 1814(d) (Supp. 1979).
U.S.C.A. §1814(f) (Supp. 1979).
U.S.C.A. § 1815(b) (Supp. 1979).
Fed. Reg. 16,869 (1979).
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responsibility" has come under attack. Some commentators have suggested that insurance to cover oil spill risks would probably not be
available at any cost.' ' 7 The guaranty and indemnity methods are
considered limited because it is felt that large companies would only
indemnify or guarantee the performance of their subsidiaries.' 8
Commentators have called the surety method "totally useless." ' 9
The cost of a surety bond can be expected to be two percent per
year. In addition to the yearly cost, however, a bonded company
must pay back any amount paid out by the bonding company."2
Perhaps in recognition of the possible difficulties many entities will
have in meeting these financial responsibility requirements, the 1978
act requires the President to conduct a study to determine whether
adequate private oil pollution insurance protection is available on
reasonable terms and conditions to the owners and operators of vessels and offshore facilities and whether the market for such insurance
is sufficiently competitive to assure purchasers of features such as a
reasonable range of deductibles, coinsurance provisions, and exclusions.12'

B. Other Elements
There are numerous other elements of the 1978 act, only a few of
which will be noted here.
Title IV of the act establishes a Fishermen's Contingency Fund in
an amount which may not exceed $1 million to pay for damages to
commercial fishing vessels and gear due to OCS activities.' 2 2 To this
end, the holders of OCS leases, permits, easements, and pipeline
rights-of-way may be assessed amounts not exceeding $5,000 per
lease, permit, easement, or right-of-way by the Secretary of Commerce.' 23 Commercial fishermen suffering damage may file claims
for compensation which are referred to hearing examiners.' 24 In the
absence of a request for judicial review, a successful claimant is disbursed the amount of his award from the fund and the Secretary of
Commerce acquires by subrogation all rights of the claimant against
any person found to be responsible for his damages.' 2 5
Title V of the 1978 act amends that portion of the Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972 which grants funds to coastal states im117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 16,867.
See id
Id.
Id.
43 U.S.C.A. §1815(d) (Supp. 1979).
43 U.S.C.A. §1842 (Supp. 1979).
43 U.S.C.A. §1842(c) (Supp. 1979).
43 U.S.C.A. §1845 (Supp. 1979).
43 U.S.C.A. §1845(h) (Supp. 1979).
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pacted by OCS energy activities.' 26 These funds are intended to
assist coastal states in financing public facilities, public services, and
environmental costs associated with OCS activities. The 1978 act
modifies the formula by which funds are allocated,' 27 changes the
eligibility requirements for receiving funds,' 2 8 and increases the
level of funding.' 29 Title V also adds a new provision to the Coastal
Zone Management Act authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to
make grants to coastal states in the amount of 80 percent of the
costs they incur in carrying out their responsibilities under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act.' 10
Finally, it might be noted that the 1978 act requires the Secretary
of the Interior to list all shut-in' 3 1 oil wells and all gas wells flaring
natural gas on OCS leases. 1 3 2 The Secretary must also indicate the
reason each listed well is shut-in or flaring natural gas and whether
he
1
intends to require production or order the cessation of flaring. 3 3
III. CONCLUSION

The 1978 act effects many important changes in the manner in
which the United States manages its outer continental shelf lands.
Also, the same congressional concern and activities which brought
about passage of that act also sparked reform through administrative
regulations shortly before the act's passage.
Although enacted just a short time ago, the 1978 act has already
engendered much criticism. Perhaps that was a predictable result,
given the inherent conflicts among the act's objectives. The most
obvious conflict among the act's goals is that between the encouragement of petroleum development and the protection of the environment. Perhaps an equally important conflict exists between the
objectives of maximizing revenue to the federal government and the
objective of encouraging private participation in resource development. The solution, of.course, is not to do away with conflicts but to
strike a good balance between conflicting goals. It is questionable
whether the 1978 act accomplishes this goal.
For the most part, critics have not commented on the fact that
despite the many real changes made by the 1978 act, the basic phi126. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456a(b) (Supp. 1979).
127. Id
128. Id.
129. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1464 (Supp. 1979).
130. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456a(c)(2) (Supp. 1979).
131. A "shut-in" well is a producing well that has been closed down temporarily due
to the lack of a market or for repairs, building up reservoir pressure, or similar reasons.
132. 43 U.S.C.A. §1861(a) (Supp. 1979).
133. Id.
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losophy of our OCS resource policy remains the same. That philosophy is that the goals of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act can
best be achieved by private industry working under the scrutiny of
the federal and state governments. Thus, the 1978 act continues to
follow the leasehold or concession approach to the development of
natural resources on the OCS, an approach that has been common in
the development of privately owned lands in the United States, but
which is followed in increasingly fewer countries.
The trend in other parts of the world is to adopt the concept of
direct state participation in the development of petroleum resources.
This trend has not for the most part been associated with any particular political ideology. Rather, it has been based upon the selfperceived need of each nation to maximize its economic and strategic
position with respect to this critical resource.
Even though it did not radically change U.S. policies, the 1978 act
does give the federal government the means of further asserting its
presence in the management of its offshore resources. It also marks
what one hopes will be a continued effort on the part of the federal
government to deal concertedly with energy and resource issues.
Viewed in a worldwide energy context, it seems clear that the United
States today is reassessing and broadening its knowledge of and management over its energy resources.

